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REQUIREMENTS COMMUNICATION CULTURE IN MOBILE
SERVICES DEVELOPMENT
Steinar Kristoffersen, Institute for Informatics, University of Oslo, Norway,
steinkri@ifi.uio.no
“Culture is one thing and varnish is another.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson

Abstract
The software business is changing; partly due to a global re-distribution of engineering competencies,
partly due to abundant, but marginally profitable opportunities of providing lightweight infotainment
services in a global network. The software development process has not changed accordingly, and
within a broader trend of globalization, companies look towards offshore outsourcing of software
development as one way of cutting development costs. However, many stakeholders are discontent
with the quality of deliveries from offshore projects. Many of the problems are explicated by the
demographically dispersed nature of a global economy: Different cultures, language barriers and
unrealistic expectations. This paper addresses these issues from another angle. Examining in-depth
the development processes of an international company, it is concluded that outsourcing, rather than
causing upheaval to software development, ought to be seen as subjected to the same naive division of
labour as many previous attempts of ‘rationalizing’ this process. Moreover, the counter-measures
usually proposed imply ‘much more of the same’ which did not work to begin with either. Therefore,
globalization is putting empirical studies of software development back on the agenda and it indicates
a need to re-conceptualize the entire software process. A better understanding of how programmers
work is needed to back the development of methods for co-located as well as distributed development.
Keywords: Requirements engineering, communication, culture, outsourcing
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INTRODUCTION

The economy pertaining to offshore outsourcing of software development is growing at a staggering
25 percent per year1. In the public opinion, offshore development of software is seen as a threat to jobs
and innovation at home2, as it seems to be based on brilliant engineers abroad working for salaries
which are unbelievably low.
Outsourcing decisions are of course related to the cost of using local programmers (Kjell 2005). It
may save as much as 60 percent3. It is also a contributing factor to the cost/quality aspect of using
offshore development, that, e.g., India alone produces as many technical graduates as that of the entire
European continent and about twice as many as that of the United States4. Today India alone has an
offshore development industry of somewhere in the region of $15 billion. Mockus and Herbsleb point
additionally to such alluring reasons for outsourcing as getting closer to international customers,
complying with conditions for favourable tax conditions and short lead time if time differences can
lead to round-the-clock development (Herbsleb and Mockus 2003).
There are some obvious challenges to outsourcing, however:
“Communication and coordination issues in large software engineering projects have always been
formidable (e.g.5). Increasingly, engineers and managers must add the challenges of coordinating
1
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work across sites, spanning national, language, and cultural barriers (see, e.g.,6). Driven by market
and resource requirements, the push toward globalization has generated a wide variety of problems
for software developers 7.
Previous research 8 suggests that cross-site communication and coordination issues cause a
substantial loss of development speed (Herbsleb et al. 2001).”
Studies provided by Heeks, Krishna et al. highlight some of the cultural differences that might arise in
a distributed working relationship:
“Global9’s systems were drawn from a culture of objectivity and accountability. Forcing one set of
values onto the other was hard, and Shiva10’s values proved quite resilient. It took enormous efforts
before the Shiva project leader would produce a standardized monthly progress report, and Shiva staff
refused to participate in Global’s employee satisfaction survey (Heeks et al. 2001).”
There exists, intuitively, even more compelling propositions about the challenges of global
outsourcing, which include: Troublesome communication across sites; participants having different
backgrounds; participants not having participated in similar projects previously, participants having
different training, coming from different cultures and speaking different native languages. Moreover,
Herbsleb and Mockus maintain that in these projects participants are much less likely to have
serendipitous contact with each other across sites, due to the lack of face-to-face hallway encounters,
and lunch meetings. There are fewer chance encounters with remote colleagues in other words and
implicitly, therefore, this is where the improvement of outsourcing projects might be found (Herbsleb
et al. 2001).
“In organizations with rapidly changing environments and unstable projects, informal communication
is particularly important11. For example, as requirements change, it is hard for the formal mechanisms
of communication, such as specification documents, to react quickly enough (Herbsleb et al. 2001).”
Similarly, the core of the countermeasures proposed by Heeks et al., indicate that issues (even those
relating to cultural differences) in outsourcing are generally related to some form of co-ordination:
Synching, using “straddlers”, building bridging relationships, etc (Heeks et al. 2001).
Prikladnicki, Nicolas et al. summarize that the following measures are important in coming to terms
with globally distributed software development, particularly with respect to enabling “multinationals
and virtual corporations to operate successfully across geographic and cultural boundaries”
(Prikladnicki, Nicolas and Evaristo 2003):
A universal and well-defined software development process is needed in outsourcing projects
Requirements engineering ought to be seen as a seminal activity, which governs the process
Planning needs to be thorough and proper, following it up with careful management of the
execution as well as risk factors
Building a global team with an exchange program for executives can make the challenges
linked to social and cultural differences more manageable
Ironically, such recommendations do noseem to make that much of a difference in ordinary nonoutsourced and local projects, either (Basili and Perricone 1984). The problem actually seems to be
that some challenges of software development persistently plague software engineering in general: It
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is complex, unpredictable, and variable in terms of requirements and circumstances of use (The British
Computer Society 12). Motivation seems ample, therefore, to examine aspects of offshore outsourcing
in terms of dimensions that are common to software engineering research in general.
The most important finding of the research reported in this paper is that when developing new services
for the telecommunications infotainment market (quite horizontally), the “first requirement” is to be
able to accommodate continually changing requirements and scope, as and when the product adapts to
malleable value chains, new technologies and aggregating layers of agents and actors in the service
architecture. This is the one requirement that does not change. Outsourcing developers complain about
the lack of specifications, and thus implicate that they, indeed, expect to be able to get them. This we
see as an expression of distributed projects naively subjected to a “scientific” organization of work
(Taylor 1911). This is an analogy to many historical attempts to conceive of applications development
as a “software factory” in a true perspective of reductionism. The outsourcing organization responds to
that by accounting for their achievements (and underachievements, for that matter) in terms that are
relevant to this idealized organization of work.
Outsourcing works, though, in this particular organization as in most others. There is really no
indication that performance is any worse than in non-outsourced collaborative projects (Bruce,
Leverick and Littler 1995). It should not be seen as working well despite a local order of software
engineering wherein which project managers and developers contribute to formulate the specifications
when they themselves need them. Quite the opposite, it works because project managers and
developers are involved in writing specifications, meeting the customer when:
“It is difficult for the customer to make himself understood, so the spec is often not enough. It is
essential to meet him face-to-face, from time to time (quote from project manager).”
Of course this goes against a fundamental principle of outsourced development, and usually the
recommendation is to make sure requirements do not “creep” and that management of the project is
strong “within”. This paper might be taken as an indication that such recommendations are part of the
problem, rather than the solution.
The next section deals briefly with risk management as one pivotal aspect of understanding software
engineering. After that, the methodological perspective underlying the analysis of this paper is
presented. We are aware that using an ethnomethodologically influenced approach to a hybrid
approach of web-based questionnaires, albeit not at this stage primarily intended to be read
quantitatively, and face-to-face interviews, might encounter opposition. Our hope is that it can be
appreciated as a contribution in its own right, almost orthogonally to the rest of the paper. Section 4
presents the empirical results, before the discussion concludes the paper.

2

RISK MANAGEMENT

The notion of risk management has historically been at the core of software engineering
methodologies, and indeed, many of the implicitly anticipated problems of globally outsourced
software projects, such as lacking management commitment, poor requirements definition and change
management, communication problems and not having a clear and explicit process model, are
commonly held as important risks in the field (Boehm 1991; Lyytinen, Mathiassen and Ropponen
1998). We are interested therefore, to see how actors involved in global outsourcing formulate notions
of risk. Selecting one seminal article to compare our findings (Keil et al. 1998), we explore the
differences. It is not our intention to pre-empt eventual differences in the perspectives of researchers
concerned with traditional IS or mobile services and global outsourcing, respectively, at least not in an
absolute sense. That is why we have not surveyed the complete literature on risk management. Neither
is it the focus of this paper to extract a representative set of risk assessments from people involved in
distributed projects. Therefore, it has not been necessary to investigate the opinions in managers across
several companies. The ambition of this paper is more modest; to look at members’ own accounts of
risk factors in globally distributed software development, in order to characterize the situation as seen
12
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and managed by those members. Theoretically and methodologically, many of the existing
explanations of the unique nature of outsourced software development pertain to ideal and abstract
notions of culture, communication, distribution and complexity. Risk management, in this perspective,
becomes a set of practices that deal with culture, communication, distribution and complexity, e.g. In
contrast, this paper aims to show how the practices involved in risk management (among other things)
is part of a “common software engineering culture” constituted by work practices that makes a naively
rational view on the software development process work, after all and on the contrary of the stipulated
process, and this especially being the case for globally outsourced projects.

3

RESEARCH METHOD AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper is based on a study carried out in 2005. It concerns the usage of methods in a globally
distributed development environment of a company involved in developing mobile content
provisioning services. This is not a very large corporation, yet they employ approximately a hundred
people, of which half are software developers in an Eastern European country. The locally based
operation in Oslo, Norway is mainly occupied with sales and marketing, targeting customers all over
the world and clearly just as successful in the US as in Europe, and even more so in East Asia. In East
Asia, moreover, they have an outsourcing relationship (from the point-of-view of their East-European
subsidiary) going with a smaller development organization.
The data collection for this paper consisted of face-to-face interviews with five managers at various
levels from CEO to consultant at the local site of the company, plus questionnaires. The interviews
were relatively open, yet structured by an interview guide which aimed to bring about coverage of
questions regarding the use of methods, documentation practices and innovation in the company. In
order to reach the developers and the managerial level abroad, a web-based questionnaire was
developed. Twelve people responded to the questionnaire, more than half of which (7) are locally
based, working with various managerial responsibilities. For instance, one is responsible for editing a
content provisioning web-site and another for liaisoning with large media companies, production
companies, and Hollywood studios. Most of the local respondents describe themselves as product
managers. Their responsibilities comprise the “integration of mobile interactivity into their customers’
overall communications strategies”, which could entail testing handsets, compiling suites of content,
marketing and writing up requirements, or even consulting. Five respondents are based at the
outsourcing location “offshore”, working with requirements engineering and project management.
It is important to emphasize that the aim of the questionnaire was not to perform quantitative analysis
or test a hypothesis with statistical significance. This might be a fruitful approach in future research,
for which this first round will work as a pilot. However, at this stage, it was considered simply to be a
reasonably cost-effective approach to carrying out interviews ‘at a distance’.
The analysis of this paper, quite in contradistinction to the much of the previous work on outsourcing,
which due, probably, to the global nature of the outsourcing phenomena has taken a much more
‘macro’ perspective, is based on the participants’ own reflection, accounts and ‘shared-and-taken-forgranted’ knowledge of the situation. In this respect, it is heavily influenced by ethnomethodology.
In most research papers in IS and related fields, one will find that ethnomethodology is most
commonly associated with ethnographic data collection. Data and experiences upon which
ethnomethodological analysis are based usually come from ‘shadowing’ the actors, and it is often
believed that ‘naturally occurring’ data do carry particular import to such analysis. Participant
observation is, with its emphasis on ‘real-world, real-time’ of course at the very heart of ethnography,
which, in the next instance, lends itself, at least on the surface, nicely to an ethnomethodological
analysis since it focuses on the local circumstances and socially observable accounts of work ‘as-and
when’ it is carried out (Crabtree et al. 2000). This is not predominantly the case for this paper. The
question (and perhaps objection), then, becomes naturally, is it possible to do an
ethnomethodologically informed analysis based on a mix of face-to-face and web-form based
interview-data? We realize that this is an approach that might strike a lot of people as odd, but must
then refer to the rich variety of experimental approaches applied in ethnomethodology for support
(Garfinkel 1967).
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It is important to bear in mind, then, that, participating in an interview or responding to a questionnaire
in itself can be seen, of course, as an everyday, locally situated and ‘accountable’ activity, from which
we can learn, ethnomethodologically speaking, just as much or more about what people do in those
particular settings, as one can learn about their work. This is not an attempt to promote a naïve punchline along the lines that people do not say exactly what they mean when they are interviewed or
respond to web-based questionnaire (although that is probably the case as well, from time to time). It
means that an interview or replies to a questionnaire rather than being treated as a positive imprint of
the external world could be seen as ‘data in itself’, as indeed is the case for this paper, and subjected to
a reflexive analysis.
Reading this paper it is useful to consider the analytical platform that ethnomethodology as such
represents, inasmuch as it gives significant status rather than treating as only residual aspects of social
phenomena, the subjective orientation and multiple levels of logics; and the situated rationale of the
participants themselves, to the very extent that it constitutes a systematic set of methods for
‘achieving’ an organization of their work, as software developers and project managers, and producing
meaningful accounts of such work. This means, therefore, that participants are not treated as “cultural
dopes” or pieces on a chess-board which are simply subjected to institutionalized forces from without,
which, behind their backs, as it were, expose actors to a systematic “grammar” that can only be viewed
from the “prioritized” vantage points of science. Instead, the methodological point of view of this
paper is that of the actors themselves.
Of course, the ethnomethodological objection to functional explanations thus subscribed to is
particularly amicable toward looking for alternatives to the dominant assertions about cultural factors
and communication problem influencing the performance and organization of offshore outsourcing of
software. Some might even argue that it is biased or anti-theoretical in this respect. This is not the
case. The ethnomethodological stance levels out the bias that was there from before, by which research
on offshore outsourcing has given residual status to the participants’ own accounts of culture and
communication, treating it either as a positive image of “the way things are” (in cases where it
overlaps with the theoretical perspective of the researcher) or as an external force from which the
actors actions are essentially determined.
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RESULTS

Looking at the web-based interview form, which was administered to 12 managers in the distributed
development organization, we find that there is some systematic bias in the reports. For instance, the
attitudes taken from the “western” perspective of the Oslo operation seems to confirm the findings
from previous research (Coward 2003). The product managers claim that:
Development and testing takes too long, sometimes because the people responsible do not
manage to be sufficiently proactive
Deliveries are uncertain (due to lack of control, e.g., the developers not working by a
prioritized order of projects)
Cultural difference are a big challenge, for instance it is claimed that the development
organization generally have a greater need for more detailed specifications
Communication is poor, for instance by time zone differences and language barriers making
communication less effective
From the developing organization offshore, on the other hand, the respondents pointed to the general
attitude that “outsourcing” product managers had towards them, perhaps seeing tight schedules and
insufficient funding as a concretization of such attitudes. More notably, they objected that “the
customer” was changing the scope of objects of the project underway, adding functionality after the
design and development “checkpoints.” And this is an important formulation by the project managers;
they see communication problems as a manifestation of product managers in Oslo lacking the capacity
to state their desires in the “lingua franca” of systems development, namely the requirements
specification. Therefore, it is necessary, they claim, to meet with the product managers face-to-face.
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The situation “inshore”, however, is quite different (almost the opposite), as shown by the following
quote from one of the managers about how a game application typically is conceived:
“You go to the customer and ask him, ‘so you want a web page,’ right, then the question is how do you
want to market it, in printed press, okay, and how you want to reach the customer is via SMS, and then
we have a standard interface for that, that is that info in, sending it, game number, our partner logs
onto our server and provides the info and then we push the content, and we can bill. Or if our
customer have got a solution then we write the report, there are lots of opportunities, lots of
standards…The point is if you ‘know your game’ when you get to an opportunity, well, because the
customer does not know what he want, but if you have a standard package there, it is no hocuspocus…We’ve developed solutions where people pay for games, even though that is not allowed. The
operator does not care, you are not supposed to be able to pay for your shirts, but everyone is doing
it.”
This excerpt indicates that there is, indeed, no specification ‘out there’ to grab and fix on paper, since
the customer does not know what he wants, i.e., the application development is not needs driven. This
is not really surprising, but we ought to notice that the ‘operation’ of selling is made with reference to
“finished solutions” and “standards,” which, it turns out, are not standardized at all. Firstly there are
many competing standards to choose from; secondly, one tends to ‘stretch’ beyond that to make the
project outperform its own premises.
That has obvious consequences, but the findings go deeper: These projects are supposed not to be
large-scale development projects. Given multifarious standards and solutions ‘that we have already,’
“Turnarounds are much quicker and does not take any time. “
However, mobile services are offered to the market in a layered architecture, reflecting a value chain
with multiple actors each taking a ‘cut’ of each others revenue. In each step of the aggregate, a new
stakeholder is introduced with their individual brand, approach, desires and experiences, which, in the
next instance will influence the ‘requirements’.
It is interesting to observe, in terms of alleged communication problems, that that is always
“somebody else’s problem”. In this particular organization, e.g., the product managers “locally”
complained about communication problems vs. the East European site, which in its term complained
about communication problems vs. a development site even further East, in China. In terms of the
“reverse direction” of communication, however, the developers at the East European site do not
perceive themselves as being “at the sharp end” of communication problems, although they do
indicate that the product managers might not know how to produce a requirements specification, and
when they do, it is likely to be changed again and again after programming has actually started.
Thus, there seems to be an indication here that “communication problems” ought to be conceived of
much specifically and precisely, and in this case it circles around the capacity to communicate what
one wants the developers to develop. But this is exactly what one did not know, and still agreed to
build, approaching the matter in a “standard-yet-to-be-developed” fashion from the Oslo side initially.
The specification of requirements, and the work thus involved, rightly seems to deserve ‘cornerstone’
status with regards to further analysis. It is actually possible already to bring this to the fore,
analytically speaking, and say that lacking the competencies, and/or treating the writing of exact
requirements as an ‘option’ along the tradition that is expected by the software developers and the
technical managers, as such is glossed by referring to it as a communication issue or a cultural issues,
as indeed one of the managers locally did when he referred to the “offshore” developers as “not
understanding our requirements specification culture”. The sales organization and product manager
‘manage the customer’s expectations’ and ‘plan the project’ with ‘adequate’ understanding of what the
project entails. It is an observable and accountable praxis to treat such adequate descriptions as
constitutive of the social order, i.e., reasonable platform to initiate projects, in this case. The project’s
offshore managers, however, inversely question the adequacy of the specification that they receive,
exactly in a way that indicates a ‘disruption’ of the working relationship.
The outsourcing organization deals with this situation by asking the developers to write the
requirements’ specifications:
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“Our outsourcing organization wants a requirements’ specification, but since we do not have enough
people we’ve asked them to write a proposal themselves, but then they are annoyed when we tell them
they did not get it right. I would have liked to have more senior people here, like a proper development
department, which could pull this off.”
Contrasted then with expectancies of globally distributed projects as resting on a weak set of
requirements, or at least an extraneous requirements specification, which are actually written by the
party farthest away from the customer in absolute as well as ‘cultural’ terms, we surprisingly find that
globally outsourced projects are considered “better” by local product managers with regard to
finishing on time than in-house ones, and only less trustworthy than locally outsourced projects in this
respect. Four from seven of the product managers (not necessarily the same for each dimension) agree
that globally outsourced projects finish on time, are well planned and documented, and have
requirements which are within expectations. Local managers tend to think those projects which have
been “locally” outsourced, e.g., carried out by consultants in the same city, do better than even inhouse projects, in terms of finishing on time.
This is most likely not a reliable ‘certification’ of project properties, since they tend to inconsistently
be allocated to different sites depending on project type, as the following two excerpts show:
“The requirement is always the same: produce an innovative and effective product! If there is an inhouse capability, then that is my first choice. Local is next and global is third. The final determinant
is: ‘what will produce the best result?’”
And:
“Often the level of complexity from a technical point of view is the criteria. Simple things you tend to
solve in-house.”
Looking further at similar questions, we find that projects basically are ‘the same but different’
regardless of being organized as in-house or outsourced. In-house projects are, on one hand,
considered by their “inshore” product managers to be much more likely of meeting the requirements
than alternative project organizations, which is exactly what the “offshore” product managers believe
is the case with the projects that are “local” to themselves, i.e., in this figure categorized as “globally
outsourced”.
The trend seems to be that both parties believe that they do better than the others, but that their own
global development partner does better than the “inshore outsourcing” alternative, with one exception
being that product managers inshore believe this particular alternative fares better in terms of
delivering projects on time.
We asked the managers at both sites to rank items from a list of software development risks, which
have previously been developed by Keil, Cule et al (1998). Treating the notion of risk rationally, they
assert that one needs to identify and rank risk according to its relative importance, in order for
managers to concentrate on those areas which seems most “cost-effective”. Classification of risk is,
according to Keil, Cule et al. (1998) an important tool since it implies which risk alleviation strategies
are most applicable and effective. Keil, Cule et al. point out the importance of revisiting the list of
prominent software project risk factors developed by Barry Boehm (1991), since “the organizational
and technological landscape has changed considerably since [this] work appeared (Keil, Cule et al.
1998, p. 77)”. We consider that to be even more so the case, now, with the emergence of global,
ubiquitous computing in the guise of mobile multimedia telephony and games.
From the 12 people in our first “managerially-oriented” questionnaire, no-one put “lack of top
management commitment to the project” on the top. Noticeably, compared to Keil et al.’s list, 5 out of
12 people put this last on their list! Similarly, no-one put “failure to gain user/stakeholder commitment
on the top of their list, although two people placed this second. Instead, 5 out of 12 put this as number
10 out of 11. The last of the customer mandate-oriented risks (Keil et al. 1998), “lack of adequate enduser involvement” was more uniformly distributed from the top to the bottom of the list of priorities.
Commitment was seen as equally unimportant with both camps; inshore product developers as well as
offshore project managers.
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Looking at a slight modified version of the data, however, brings out some new dimensions. Firstly, by
aggregating the scores from 1-3 into “Important”; 4-6 into “Less important”; 7-9 into “Almost
unimportant” and finally 10-11 and n/a into “Unimportant”, we find that not only does “Changing
scopes and requirements get a majority of the votes as them most important risk factor, but the other
risk-factors relating to requirements management, e.g., 9 out of 12 similarly considered “Requirements
not frozen/lack of change management” to be important (in the top half) as well as misunderstanding
the requirements which are put in the top half by 10 people.
Lack of top management commitment to the proj ect

9
Failure to gain user/stakeholder commitment

8
7

Misunderstanding the requirements

6

Lack of adequate end-user inv olv ement

5

Failure to manage stakeholder expectations

4

Changing scope or obj ectiv es of the proj ect underway

3
2

Lack of required knowledge/skills in the proj ect
personnel

1

Requirements not frozen/lack of change management

0

Introduction of new technology (hardware/software)

Im portant

Som ew hat
im portant

Not so
im portant

Unim portant

Not enough resources/inappropriate staffing
Conflicts between different stakeholder groups in the
proj ects

Figure 1: The view on risk

Some of these variables are quite balanced, e.g., “Lack of management commitment to the project” is
seen as moderately important and unimportant, at the same time. Looking more closely at the data, we
find that user mandate-oriented risks (Keil et al. 1998) are not ranked as high priority risks by the
“offshore” project managers, only by product managers placed locally. Looking at resources and
staffing, however, we do not have sufficient evidence to say that there is a difference as to how people
in the different types of locations perceive the situation, yielding an interpretation in the direction of
this simply being project-dependent. In terms of having the right competencies, however, the
following quote is one interesting indication:
“The biggest problem is having the capacity to do the specification work, but I have tried to get
‘offshore’ to do more of it. The problem is that the project manager ‘offshore’ have got too many
things to manage, and that is a problem right now, no one has the time to follow up continuously, but
if we had had one person assigned to that…We have not written a design, yet, the specification, you
know are made like ‘we need this and this and this’ and then we sort it out along the way. It might be a
high risk venture, but we’ll see”
Summarizing the findings, the scope and requirements of a project in our case of mobile services
development is not considered by “inshore” product managers as something that they control.
“Offshore” project managers ask for better specifications, according to an idealized project process
which is part of the “outsourcing institution”, as it were. In return they are asked to write the
requirements’ specification themselves. This ought, according to a reductionist and rational view of
software engineering to be working poorly, but in our case we found the opposite to be true. It actually
works quite well. In the next section we will compare these findings with pervious work on software
project risks, and see how it can be explained.
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DISCUSSION

One of the challenges in studying outsourcing projects quantitatively is that there is great variation
between projects (Sjøberg et al. 2005), perhaps too great to be able to generalize findings and
recommendations. Instead, therefore, this paper is based on an in-depth study of one organization, the
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findings for which is compared to allegedly general findings from previous work (e.g., (Keil et al.
1998).
We have studied an organization which is deeply engaged in developing various components of
content provision services for the international mobile market. Similarly to Smith and Mitra (Smith,
Mitra and Narasimhan 1996), we found that the prevalent frameworks for analyzing distributed
development have perhaps been slightly too narrowly focusing on:
Outsourcing as the cause of, rather than the result of, a redistribution of competencies
Communication and cultural issues as determinants ‘from without’, exerting constraints on
projects, and
Outside issues, at ‘face value’, wholly or partly stipulating which managerial practices ought
to be applied to “bridge” such gaps
One perspective towards our findings is that they are no different from the ‘ordinary rhetoric’ which
have always motivated software engineering research; seeing projects as complex, deliveries as hard to
estimate and predict in terms of time, cost and quality and needing to secure the commitment of major
shareholders and lead executives. However, although much is the same as asserted by e.g., Keil et al.
(Keil et al. 1998), there are also many differences. We believe that this is due to the characteristic
properties of projects here being outsourced, which is, typically, reasonable small and innovative, but
most of all, “un-fixed” in terms of their requirements although they were conceived and explicitly
possible to conceive as they were based on standard technologies and proven, albeit meagre, business
models. This alone indicates that one ought to be sceptical of claims that such projects’ performance
can be improved by “supermanaging” it with an (even) unified process, (even) stronger focus on
requirements, (even) better planning and (even) more teambuilding (cf. (Prikladnicki, Nicolas and
Evaristo 2003). This is not only due to the ‘inevitably creeping’ requirements, but because it
represents a conceptualization of the software process as one in which the project is subjected to risk
from without! This is a common perspective in software engineering (Boehm 1991). Similarly, Keil et
al. treat risk as external to the project and something alien and foreign to the product itself (Keil et al.
1998). This does not seem at all to be the case for the software processes described in this paper. The
projects referred to by product managers in the organization are exactly about taking risks. This further
raises the question about risk and risk management, not as a rational exercise of calculating the
severity and probabilities of events, but as ‘work in itself’, ethnomethodogically seen as accounting for
the application (or lack thereof) of systematic methods. After all, since software engineering
methodologies are explicitly oriented towards dealing with extraneous risk, ‘risk from without’ in a
predictive and rational fashion, ‘acting as a software engineering professional’ entails referring to such
terms.
Keil et al suggest that they have found eleven stable, global and universal risk factors. The
introduction of new technology was not considered particularly significant. This is different from our
findings, where a majority of managers say that they consider the introduction of new technology to be
an important risk. This is understandable; inasmuch as the projects are sold with reference to their
‘finished’ status and that the conceptual complexity of services for mobile phones, at the current stage,
arguably is still limited. Keil et al., moreover, suggest that the importance of top management support
is obvious, and in their panels’ many managers espoused this factor as a risk that overshadowed all
others. This is very different from our results, after carefully analyzing the data we found that this was,
indeed, one of the least important risk factors that people considered. Some people thought that it was
important, but no-one classified it as “somewhat important”.
“Another prime area of concern to the panellists was the failure to gain user commitment which was
viewed as critical because it helps ensure that users are actively involved in the requirements
determination process, and it creates a sense of ownership, thereby minimizing the risk that the system
will be rejected. To some, strong user commitment was seen as something that could even compensate
for a lack of executive commitment (Keil et al. 1998, p. 79)”.
This points firmly in the direction of Keil et al. describing entirely different types of projects than what
we do, and this of course explains also that both “panels” of managers can attribute the greatest
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importance to risk management (including the role of new technology), but mean by it quite different
things.
Interestingly, Keil et al.’s respondents put great emphasis in the detailed and stable set of
requirements, as do our respondents. They claim that “requirements drive the entire project”. This is
also something that implicitly underlies the request for better requirements from our project managers,
however, we find notably that “our” project are successful in terms of time, quality and even “meeting
the requirements” even in the alleged absence of such requirements.
Does this indicate that our case is poorly representing the outsourcing situation of most companies,
then, since the projects described here are at least perceived as highly innovative? Intuitively and
sometimes even claimed by members, the degree of innovation in a project is an important
determinant in the outsourcing decision. There exists, however, empirical evidence that exactly the
opposite is the case:
“We expected that firms that invest heavily in R&D pursue innovation, seek long-term profits, and
aggressively undertake risky initiatives, and therefore are likely to develop IT systems internally
rather than purchase them through the market. The results indicate exactly the opposite; that is, the
greater the intensity in R&D, the higher the propensity to outsource IT (Oh 2005).”
We maintain, therefore, that our findings are representative and relevant. It indicates on the other hand,
perhaps, that the instrument by which risks are measured and categorized provide insufficient
coverage of innovative projects. One of the most emphasized findings from Keil et al.’s study is that
the risk that managers believed to be most important was also the ones most often not under their
direct control (Keil et al. 1998). Even more clearly, they organize their findings in a conceptual
framework comprising two dimensions, perceived relative importance of risk and perceived level of
control, and most of the risk factors which scored highly on both dimension could be seen as
pertaining to the requirements definition of the project. But in the cases that we describe here, exactly
the opposite is the case, requirements are completely beyond the development organization’s control.
For instance, for one customer in China, the value network comprises up to five layers of agents which
each of them might get a cut from each others’ revenue. Each layer will influence the ‘requirements’
and contribute to drift in the project, and this is not a factor that should be seen as external to the
project, is it ‘part-and-parcel’ of doing software engineering in this case.
We believe we have shown that in these projects, requirements should not be seen as changing; the
product of the organization that we have studied is exactly about being able to change the product
underway and this is a stable requirement. This is consistent with managers’ claim that:
“The requirement is always the same: produce an innovative and effective product!”
The software industry is taking on new challenges in terms of the type of projects, products and
services that they target, for which the requirements necessarily are more weakly specified and
evolutionary by nature. This means that developers have to work more closely with customers and
product managers need to know a lot more about the technical challenges and technical opportunities
pertaining to a project. But this “goes against the grain” of many other changes in society. The
motivation and interest in, and respect for engineering education and culture in the developed
countries are rapidly decreasing. This has to have implications for how the projects are organized, and
the choice of approach. Fewer people are available locally to do the technical work that is required.
Moreover, a lot of the projects are only marginally profitable and therefore organization cannot afford
to keep their own full-fledged development organization. With naive understanding of the software
development process as impetus, the organization of work implied by outsourcing is crudely taylorist,
and it is from this that many of the ’outsourcing’ challenges stem. An assumption of developers being
able to take on a set of specifications and then program them in a ”man-machine-like” fashion
program a system according to specification, violates one of ethnomethodology’s central tenets,
namely the ”unsatisfied substitutability of objective for indexical expressions”. Similar experiences
have been documented previously when a similarly reductionist perspective on software engineering
has been applied (Gibbs 1994). The question remains, however, are there any differences between
globally outsourced projects’ challenges and those of software engineering in general? Kliem (2004)
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recognize that although many risk factors are shared between outsourced and local projects, there are
some challenges that allegedly face offshore projects uniquely, for instance:
Lack of interaction between team members
Unclear responsibilities
Unmanaged conflict
Scope creep, no prioritization of change requests
Inadequate feedback on cost and schedule (mal-) performance
Conflicting standards of coding, behaviour, decision making- and communication procedures
Animosity, historical or economical, between nationalities, cultures, institutions, etc.
Kliem (2004) nicely explicates the relationship between these risks and the geographically, culturally
and institutionally dispersed nature of outsource software development, in such a way that it becomes
possible to see geography, culture and institution as accounts of the order of globally outsourced
software development, and in this respect, the expression of and manifestation of certain properties of
such projects, rather than the other way around. And that is exactly what the most important
contribution of this paper is. There is perhaps a cultural difference, but not been the East and the West
(significantly), rather it is within “understanding of requirements communication culture” (a quote
from one of the managers in our case). Bearing in mind that although there are (always) complaints
raised from developers against ‘sales’, about the poor quality of specifications and the lack of change
management, it is interesting that they are still, on both sides of the ‘cultural divide’, comfortable with
the performance of the projects versus the requirements.
The rationalization of the software process has deep historical roots, and there are at least two clear
lineages of thinking that can be read from the conceptualization of distributed and locally organized
project models alike; namely that software engineering is about translation from one representation to
another and that this is a “lossless” function (Kyle 2002), and, that it can, indeed, in a reductionist
fashion be subdivided into clearly packaged units of work onto which other units of work can build via
well-defined interfaces (Raccoon 1997). In opposition to such decisive, early software engineering
philosophies, is not groundbreaking in itself to maintain that software engineering might not be
rationalizable in a traditional sense (Ilavarasan and Arun Kumar 2003):
“Software work stands as less saturated work. Even if tasks are relatively integrated, complete closure
of spaces for play in the structure of skills is difficult to achieve. That is, the worker has enough space
to use his creativity and imagination in the work (ibid p. 4).”
One might look at propositions of synching, using “straddlers” and building bridging relationships as
more subtle expressions of the same fundamental view on software engineering as a “downstream”
process of distinct stages (Heeks et al. 2001). We have found it useful to turn the perspective of
outsourcing strategies around. As a complement to trying to find out which strategy can be applied to
the outsourcing scenario in order to make it more likely to succeed (Akmanligil and Palvia 2004), or
how to select the exact location for development work given a project characteristic (Graf and
Mudambi 2005), is would useful instead to find out which project characteristic or outsourcing
strategy that comes out of a certain set of globally distributed working relationships.
This paper points toward revising the risk identification framework proposed by Keil et al. (1998) so
that it can be used for a broader set of projects, including horizontal applications and innovative
services for the mobile consumer. Even more importantly, this paper indicates that it is time (again) to
start thinking about software engineering not as a process of translating requirements into a running
system, but as a social and creative arena in which customers and developers meet to discuss and
implement ideas, which might originate equally from developers as well as customers; regardless of
programmers being from one part of the world or the other.
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